Title
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Author
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Year
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Antitrust via Rulemaking: Competition Catalysts
Some observers note a decline in competition in American industry; fewer new firms are entering the market, and markets are becoming more concentrated. Federal and state agencies can devise regulations to catalyze competition.
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Tim Wu |
2017 |
Antitrust and Intellectual Property: A Brief Introduction
This chapter explores the conflict between antitrust law and intellectual property (IP) rights. Antitrust law aims at limiting monopoly power, while IP rights tend to establish limited monopolies in ideas, but IP rights rarely confer the ability to raise prices without losing customers.
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Keith Hylton |
2017 |
Patent Assertion Entities and Competition Policy
Firms that own and license patents but do not produce anything are known as patent assertion entities (PAE), or patent trolls. PAE can harm competition and innovation. This book collects studies of PAEs and competition policy from the United States, China, Korea, and Europe.
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Daniel Sokol |
2017 |
Blind Spot: The Attention Economy and the Law
Firms like Google and Facebook rely on consumer attention, a limited resource. Consumer protection laws and antitrust law assume that harm must be monetary, and do not effectively control problems that arise from unwanted intrusions on our attention.
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Tim Wu |
2017 |
Antitrust Provides a More Reasonable Regulatory Framework than Net Neutrality
In 2015, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) imposed network neutrality rules on Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The rules depressed investment and harmed consumers. In 2017, the FCC started a proceeding to end net neutrality regulation.
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Joshua Wright |
2017 |
Platform Ecosystems: How Developers Invert the Firm
This paper describes why firms like Apple, Microsoft, and Google choose to orchestrate the creation of products by outside developers rather than to create product internally. Firms that produce digital products like software benefit most from this strategy, because of knowledge spillovers.
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Geoffrey Parker, Marshall Van Alstyne, Xiaoyue Jiang |
2017 |
Law, Social Welfare, and Net Neutrality
Net neutrality rules bar broadband carriers from charging different prices to different Internet users, but this would mean that ordinary consumers are paying more for Internet service so that firms like Netflix can pay less.
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Keith Hylton |
2017 |
FRAND in India
Some patents must be licensed on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. In India, both the Competition Commission of India (CCI) and the courts have decided FRAND disputes. The CCI’s decisions lack detail and adopt different rules than the courts.
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Daniel Sokol, Shubha Ghosh |
2016 |
Reflecting on the 1996 Act
The 1996 Telecommunications Act was intended to open communications markets to competition. Legislators did not foresee the role that the Internet and wireless service would play in increasing competition; instead, they emphasized the importance of local telephone networks.
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Gregory L. Rosston, Bradley Wimmer |
2016 |
The Death of Antitrust Safe Harbors: Causes and Consequences
In the 1980s and 1990s, antitrust courts ruled that some business behavior would be presumed legal under antitrust case law and merger guidelines, creating “safe harbors.” In the twenty-first century, most of those safe harbors have disappeared.
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Joshua Wright, Lindsey M. Edwards |
2016 |