ACADEMIC ARTICLE SUMMARY
Antitrust
Article Source: Harvard Discussion Paper No. 575; NBER Working Paper No. 12867; Handbook of Law and Economics, A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds., Elsevier 2007
Publication Date:
Time to Read: 1 minute readWritten By:
Carl ShapiroTAP Scholar
Louis Kaplow
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ARTICLE SUMMARY
Summary:
This paper provides an overview of competition economics and law today in the United States.
POLICY RELEVANCE
Policy Relevance:
The general trend is that antitrust law is becoming more consistent with the views of current economists. But there are significant areas in which courts do not use all the economic tools at their disposal.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Key Takeaways:
- In antitrust law, only firms with “market power” are closely scrutinized, though just having market power is not illegal. Most firms have at least some market power.
- Market power is linked to how much a firm can raise prices without losing business, which depends on the strength of consumer demand, market share, and rivals’ responses.
- Collusion between firms means that market power will not always be obvious.
- Market power can be inferred from the difference between price and cost, a firm’s behavior, or models that assess demand.
- In theory, cartels can be unstable. But some, like OPEC, last a long time. Economics known as game theory predicts that there will be many cartels, but is not a good match for reality.
- Mergers between competitors can result in increased prices or make collusion more likely. Some studies show that the firms can reduce costs, which has economic benefits. Some case studies show that mergers result in higher prices.
- Enforcers should be skeptical that mergers benefit consumers.
- Antitrust law can be used to assess behavior by just one firm that might harm consumers and competition. Predatory pricing or agreements to deal exclusively with others are suspect.
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About Carl Shapiro
Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy at the Haas School of Business, and Professor of Economics in the Economics Department, at the University of California at Berkeley. His current research interests include antitrust economics, intellectual property and licensing, patent policy, product standards and compatibility, and the economics of networks and interconnection.
