F. Scott Kieff
Stevenson Bernard Professor of Law
Department: School of Law
Colleges / Universities: George Washington University
F. Scott Kieff is the Stevenson Bernard Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Center for Law, Economics and Finance (C-LEAF) at George Washington University Law School. His research focuses on the law, economics, and politics of innovation, including entrepreneurship, corporate governance, finance, economic development, trade, intellectual property, antitrust, bankruptcy, medical ethics, technology policy, and health policy.
Professor Kieff was appointed as a Commissioner of the U.S. International Trade Commission by President Barack Obama and unanimously confirmed by the Senate; he served in this role from October 2013 through the summer of 2017. He also has served as an advisor to high-level government offices during the Bush, Obama, and Trump Presidential Administrations on national security and economics. In the private sector, he works through Kieff Strategies LLC to bring together fellow academics, former government officials, and business practitioners to collaboratively engage complex challenges facing firms in technology, finance, business, and law.
Professor Kieff was recognized as one of the Nation’s “Top 50 under 45” by the magazine IP Law & Business in May, 2008, and was inducted as a Member of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts in March, 2012.
Before attending law school at the University of Pennsylvania, he studied molecular biology and microeconomics at MIT and conducted research in molecular genetics at the Whitehead Institute.
Degrees
B.S. M.I.T.
J.D. University of Pennsylvania
Recent Academic Article Summaries
Perspectives on Patentable Subject Matter
Commentators disagree as to whether some new ideas should be eligible for patent protection. Protection for business methods, software, methods for treating and diagnosing disease, and DNA is controversial. However, a rule that such technologies can never be patented might not be workable.
Patent protection for new technologies might not be as helpful as for technologies of the past.
The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government Hold-Up Replacing Private Coordination
The authors argue the FTC’s patent regulation proposal is an overreach that will disrupt and impede the IP marketplace.
The FTC’s proposal to change patent regulation is unnecessary and violates the notion that if “it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” The FTC ought to exercise restraint rather than institute a rule that reduces private coordination in IP.
How Not to Invent a Patent Crisis
This chapter assesses recent changes to the patent system and proposes reforms.
Proposed changes to the patent system that give officials more discretion are likely to fail; a few simple changes will reform the system without causing uncertainty.
Economic Perils of U.S. Patent Reform: Flexibility's Achilles Heel
This article reviews proposals for patent reform.
Generally, inventors’ rights need to be certain, so the inventor can plan for the future. Patent reform that gives examiners or courts too much discretion will undermine the system. Patent reforms that support certainty are best.
On Coordinating Transactions in Information: A Response to Smith’s Delineating Entitlements in Information
This paper discusses some of the benefits of the patent system for innovators.
Policy relevance: Clearly defined patent rights work like property rights and help innovators. Changes that make patent rules more uncertain invite litigation. Large firms will have an advantage, as they do in Japan.
Blog Posts
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