James Anton
Hanes Corporation Foundation Professor
Department: Fuqua School of Business
Colleges / Universities: Duke University
Contact
100 Fuqua Drive
Durham, NC 27708
Email: james.anton@duke.edu
Website: Duke faculty page
James J. Anton is the Hanes Corporation Foundation Professor in the Economics Area at the Fuqua School of Business. He also has secondary appointments in the Department of Economics at Duke and at UNC. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University and, prior to joining the Fuqua faculty in 1989, he served on the faculty at the State University of New York at Stony Brook.
Professor Anton's interests are in the area of applied microeconomic theory and industrial organization economics. His research focuses on issues involving information, incentives, contracting, and property rights in markets where strategic rivalry between firms is an important feature. He has published papers on innovation incentives and intellectual property rights, competitive pricing and sourcing, procurement contracts, auctions, incentive regulations, and antitrust issues.
Professor Anton has taught a variety of courses at Fuqua, including managerial economics, economic environment of the firm (macroeconomics), and competitive analysis, and he has taught in several degree programs at Fuqua. His teaching has been recognized on past occasions, including the Outstanding Professor Award from the Global Executive Classes of 2003 and of 2001.
Professor Anton's research has been published in a variety of economics journals, including the American Economic Review, the International Economic Review, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, The Review of Economic Studies, the RAND Journal of Economics, the Journal of Public Economics, and the Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, and also in law and policy journals. He currently serves on the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics, as Associate Editor at Management Science, and is past Co-editor of the Journal of Economics and Management Strategy.
Degrees
Ph.D. Stanford University, 1984
B.S. Emory University, 1978
Recent Academic Article Summaries
Compatibility, Interoperability, and Market Power in Upgrade Markets
This paper explains how innovation in software markets tends to limit price increases by leading firms.
Firms that release regular upgrades of their products can gain limited market power, because buyers can choose to stay with the older version instead of buying the new one.
Attracting Skeptical Buyers: Negotiating for Intellectual Property Rights
This paper looks at how confidentiality protects innovation.
Inventors cannot sell their ideas without revealing them. To encourage them to sell, the ideas need some protection. But not too much, or buyers will hesitate to negotiate.
Quality, Upgrades and (The Loss of) Market Power in a Dynamic Monopoly Model
This paper looks at how consumers can avoid the power of a monopoly.
Even when a firm is dominant, consumers can often avoid the harm of high prices by their own choices.
Policy Implications of Weak Patent Rights
This article analyzes the effect that weak patents have on policy, disclosure, competition, and property rights.
Patent policy is often made by considering the implications of granting strong patent protection. However, many patents lack the full force of patent rights and should be considered in creating future policy reform.
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