Jay Pil Choi
Adjunct Professor, Finance Department
Department: Department of Economics
Colleges / Universities: Michigan State University
Contact
210B Marshall-Adams Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824
Email: choijay@msu.edu
Jay Pil Choi is University Distinguished Professor at Michigan State University and Scientia Professor at the University of New South Wales. His areas of expertise include intellectual property rights, economics of network effects, and antitrust economics. Professor Choi offers courses in the Economics of the Internet and Electronic Commerce, Game Theory, and Industrial Organization.
His recent published works include "Recent Developments in Antitrust: Theory and Evidence" and "Network Securities: Vulnerabilities and Disclosure Policy", with Chaim Fershtman and Neil Gandal. He currently serves as co-editor for the International Journal of Industrial Organization, and is on the editorial board of the Information Economics and Policy, International Telecommunications Policy Review, and Journal of the Korean Econometric Society.
Degrees
B.A. Economics Seoul National University, 1982
M.A. Economics Seoul National University, 1983
Ph.D. Economics Harvard University, 1990
Recent Academic Article Summaries
Network Security: Vulnerabilities and Disclosure Policy
This paper asks if software firms should be required to tell customers about security flaws (“mandatory disclosure”).
The authors show that requiring firms to disclose security bugs is sometimes helpful to consumers, but not always. A "bug bounty" program is always helpful.
Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent Litigation
Usually, firms are uncertain whether patents are valid or invalid, and how the patents will be interpreted. This uncertainty affects firms’ willingness to license patents or form patent pools. Patent pools shelter invalid patents from challenges.
Antitrust authorities should disallow patent pools before courts have ruled on the validity of the pooled patents.
Alternative Damage Rules and Probabilistic Intellectual Property Rights: Unjust Enrichment, Lost Profits, and Reasonable Royalty Remedies
This paper considers the effects of alternative damage rules in patent infringement cases on competition.
If patent holders are not given enough damages when their patents are infringed, it will discourage research and development.
Net Neutrality and Investment Incentives
Asks if proposals to restrict ISPs from charging more for faster service would discourage investors.
The authors show that sometimes network neutrality rules could mean more investment in Internet bandwith, and sometimes less. The rules might encourage many businesses that use the Internet as a platform, but it might mean less investment in technology that needs a "fast lane".
How Reasonable is the "Reasonable" Royalty Rate - Damage Rules and Probabilistic Intellectual Property Rights
This paper considers how to measure damages in patent infringement cases.
If patent holders are not given enough damages when their patents are infringed, it will discourage research and development.
Blog Posts
Related Scholars
Barbara van Schewick
Colleges / Universities: Stanford University
Bruce Kobayashi
Colleges / Universities: George Mason University
Carl Shapiro
Colleges / Universities: University of California, Berkeley
Christopher Sprigman
Colleges / Universities: New York University
