A. Mitchell Polinsky
Department: School of Law
Colleges / Universities: Stanford University
Contact
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
Email: polinsky@stanford.edu
Website: Stanford faculty profile
A pioneering American figure in the applications of economic theory to law, A. Mitchell Polinsky is a prolific scholar, producing work on the economic analysis of a wide variety of legal issues, from property to contract law to liability and punitive damages. He has written major articles on the economic efficiency of various forms of legal sanctions in achieving deterrence across a range of problems, including criminal law, contract, and tort disputes. Professor Polinsky is the founder and director of the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics at Stanford Law School. He has been a Guggenheim Fellow and a president of the American Law and Economics Association, and is currently a research associate in the Law and Economics Program of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Before joining the Stanford Law School faculty in 1979, he was a member of the faculty at Harvard University.
Professor Polinsky has an appointment (by courtesy) with the Stanford University Department of Economics.
Degrees
B.A. Harvard University, 1970
Ph.D. Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1973
M.S.L. Yale Law School, 1976
Recent Academic Article Summaries
Uneasy Case for Product Liability, The
Argues that product liability analyses have been insufficient and that product liability may not be socially desirable.
Product liability has been widely adopted as a socially beneficial means for fairness; however, certain economic costs and other means of compensation have been ignored. Consequently, product liability should be reconsidered as to its benefits, especially regarding widely sold products.
Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients
This paper looks at problems with the way clients pay lawyers.
A new fee rule could reduce lawyers’ interest in managing cases to earn more money for themselves and less for the client.
Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
This article surveys many issues relating to public sector law enforcement.
In some areas such as parking fines and fines for corporate safety violations, making penalties more severe would increase deterrence without raising enforcement costs.
Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis
This paper looks at how much firms or people who harm others should pay.
Punitive damages are often set too high, and should be paid only when it is likely the wrongdoer will not be caught.
Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation
This article looks at who should be paid damages in a successful lawsuit.
To discourage risky behavior, defendants should pay the highest fines possible, but it should go to the state rather than to the plaintiff.
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