Richard Gilbert
Department: Department of Economics
Colleges / Universities: University of California, Berkeley
Contact
549 Evans Hall, #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
Email: rjgilbert@berkeley.edu
Website: UC Berkeley faculty profile
Richard Gilbert is a professor emeritus of economics at the University of California, Berkeley. He is also Chair of the Berkeley Competition Policy Center. Professor Gilbert's research specialties are in the areas of competition policy, intellectual property, and research and development.
Professor Gilbert was Chair of the Department of Economics at Berkeley from 2002 to 2005. Additionally, he worked as Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics in the U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division from 1993 to 1995.
Degrees
B.S. Electrical Engineering, Cornell University, 1966
M.S. Electrical Engineering, Cornell University, 1967
M.A. Economics, Stanford University, 1975
Ph.D. Engineering-Economic Systems, Stanford University, 1976
Recent Academic Article Summaries
Innovation Matters: Competition Policy for the High-Technology Economy
Antitrust authorities should adapt their analysis to protect innovation and future competition. High-tech firms may use strategic acquisitions or product design to exclude competitors.
Antitrust authorities should de-emphasize market definition. Broad technology licensing supports innovation.
Antitrust authorities assess the effect of mergers on innovation. Sometimes, different economic models yield different predictions about the effects of competition on innovation.
More sophisticated models improve assessment of the effect of mergers on innovation.
Licensing and Innovation with Imperfect Contract Enforcement
Weak enforcement of patent license terms might discourage licensor innovation, but encourages licensors to offer lower royalties, lowering consumer prices and promoting innovation by downstream producers.
Weak enforcement of contract terms can lead to more innovation overall.
Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Lessons from the US and the EU
This paper presents suggestions for the US government’s upcoming revision of its methods for analyzing horizontal mergers.
The US Horizontal Merger Guidelines might be revised to more carefully consider the effects of mergers on firms’ incentives to invest in research and development.
Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations by Standard Setting Organizations
This paper determines when negotiations between standard-setting firms and patent holders are economically desirable.
Some inefficiencies associated with standards setting organizations can be overcome if negotiations between patent holders and licensors are permitted.
Blog Posts
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